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Abstract—Electromagnetic emissions were measured from
several radio receivers to demonstrate the possibility of detecting
and identifying these devices based on their unintended
emissions. Radiated fields from the different radio receivers have
unique characteristics that can be used to identify these devices
by analyzing time-frequency plots of measured radiation. A
neural network was also developed for automated device
detection.

II.

The measurement setup shown in Fig. 1 was used to capture
the radiated signal and measure the field strength. The devices
were put some distance away from the antenna. A biconical
antenna was used to measure the unintended radiation from the
receiver. The output from the antenna was connected to a preamplifier with 23 dB of gain through a 50-ohm coaxial cable.
The output of the pre-amplifier was connected to a FM bandstop filter that feeds the Rohde & Schwartz FSEB spectrum
analyzer and oscilloscope through 50-ohm coaxial cables.

Keywords-unintended emission; detection; cross-correlation;
neural network

I.

MEASUREMENT SETUP

INTRODUCTION

Electronic circuits often generate radiated electromagnetic
emissions that are readily detected [1]. For many electronic
devices, reducing emissions even below FCC mandated limits
can be a considerable challenge. Electromagnetic compatibility
engineers can often recognize the cause of problematic
emissions based only on their electromagnetic signature. If
emissions from a particular device are properly characterized,
they can be used to automatically detect, identify, and locate
this device.

Devices Under Test

antenna
3m, 7m, or 10m

pre - amplifier. 23dB

Researchers have investigated the possibility of detecting
and identifying wireless command-initiated explosive devices
based on their unintentional radiated emissions [1-3]. These
devices are good candidates for this technique because they are
often initiated through inexpensive off-the-shelf wireless
receivers that are always actively scanning for a signal from the
transmitter. Signals from the receiver's oscillator and other
internal electronics easily couple to a device’s antenna,
connection wires or structure where they are efficiently
radiated and may be used to identify its presence. The
characteristics of the radiated emissions depend on the
characteristics of the receiver, the internal electronics, and the
electronic signals within the device. These unique
characteristics can be used to detect and identify the device.

digital oscilloscope/
spectrum analyzer

Figure 1. Far field broad band measurement setup

The unintended radiation from radio receivers is relatively
low. Background noise from sources like FM radio stations can
mask these small signals. To detect the unintended radiation
from radio receivers outside the semi-anechoic chamber
requires filtering of the ambient noise. To test our ability to
detect the receivers in the presence of ambient noise, we first
did the measurement in the chamber, then opened the chamber
door and repeated the measurements. These experiments were
also done in the corridor of our building.
To test the distance from which we could locate the
receivers, the devices were put 3m, 5m, 8m, and 10m away
from the antenna. The devices tested included two different
wireless doorbell receivers and a remote control toy truck. For
each environment and each device, more than 40 sample
measurements were made. In total 2045 data samples were
collected for each device in different environments. The RF
data was digitized with a sampling rate of 2.5 Gsa/sec. 20 µs of
data was collected for each sample.

The authors are developing methods to detect, locate, and
jam wireless command-initiated devices. The methods being
used are based on a variety of tools developed by EMC and
radio engineers for analysis and testing of electronic products
and location of electromagnetic sources. In the following paper,
we will discuss preliminary research performed on receivers.
The results demonstrate the feasibility of this approach.
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III.

CHARACTERISTICS ACQUISITION

-50

A. Unintentional Radiation Pattern of these Devices
Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 show the time-domain measurements of
unintentional radiation from the remote control toy truck. It is
an AM modulated signal with a carrier frequency of 49.5 MHz
and a modulated envelope frequency of 192 kHz. Fig. 4 shows
the spectrum analyzer measurement.
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Figure 4. Unintentional radiation from the remote control toy truck
(spectrum analyzer measurement).
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A similar approach was used to test the other devices measured
in this paper. All of these devices exhibit an AM modulation.
The modulated envelope frequency and the carrier frequency
are listed in TABLE I.
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Figure 2. Unintentional radiation from the remote control toy truck
(modulated).
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Figure 3. Unintentional radiation from the remote control toy truck (zoomed
in).
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Parameters
Carrier frequency

Modulated envelop
frequency

49.5 MHz

0.19 MHz

303 MHz

0.44 MHz

303 MHz

0.69 MHz

B. Parameter acquisition
As mentioned in Section I, the unintended radiation from
radio receivers is relatively low. Background noise from
sources like FM radio stations can mask these small signals.
Fig. 5 shows a time domain measurement of the remote control
toy truck when it was 10 m from the antenna in the corridor.
The signal was difficult to observe due to the ambient RF noise
in the building. The following steps were used to extract signal
characteristics from the measurement.
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MODULATED WAVE CHARACTERISTICS OF DEVICES
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A measurement of the same device in the semi-anechoic
chamber was performed and processed per steps 1 – 3. Fig. 8
shows the result. Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 have a similar shape but a
time shift. Fig. 9 shows the envelope of ambient noise. The
shape is quite different from Fig.7 and Fig. 8.
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Figure 5. Time domain measurement of remote control toy truck in a noisy
enviroment
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A short-term FFT was performed. Fig. 6 shows a timefrequency domain analysis of radiation from the remote
control toy truck 10 m away in a noisy environment.
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Figure 7. Envelope of the measured in-band signal (10 m away)
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8 frequency bands were selected. One band from 42.5
MHz to 57.5 MHz has a very high remote control toy
truck signal, another band from 300 MHz to 330 MHz has
very high door bell signal. 6 additional frequency bands
were randomly chosen, avoiding the FM and other strong
ambient noise sources.

0.14
0.12
0.1
0.08
0.06
0.04

For each frequency band, the data in that band at each
time step was averaged to produce an amplitude vs. time
curve. The data was then normalized. Fig. 7 shows the
amplitude vs. time curve for the remote control toy truck
in the frequency band from 42.5 MHz to 57.5 MHz. In
effect, this is the envelope of the measured in-band signal.
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Figure 8. Envelope of the measured in-band signal (in chamber)

The bright points around 50 MHz are the signal from the
remote control toy truck. The bright lines around 100 MHz are
FM radio signals. The bright line around 180 MHz is another
ambient noise source.
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Figure 6. Time-frequency domain analysis of radiation from remote control
toy truck in a noisy environment
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To help detect each device, measurements were crosscorrelated with data obtained in the semi-anechoic
chamber.

described technique alone, there is no threshold value that will
yield a 100% probability of detection and a zero probability of
a false alarm.

The solid curve in Fig. 10 shows the cross-correlation result
between the 2045 samples and the measurement of the remote
control toy truck in a noise-free environment. The selected
frequency band is from 42.5 MHz to 57.5 MHz. The dashed
curve shows the measurement environment. There are six
different environments as listed in TABLE II. The higher the
environment index is, the easier it is to detect the device. A
cross correlation result that is higher than the environment
index indicates the presence of the device in that environment.
In Figure 10, the sample measurements with a cross correlation
value greater than 4 indicate the presence of the remote control
toy truck with 100% accuracy.
TABLE II.
Environment
Index

1
0.9

Probability of detection

0.8

2
3
4
5
6

0.5
0.4
0.3

0.1
0
0

ENVIRONMENT DEFINITIONS

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4
0.5
0.6
Probability of false alarm

0.7

0.8

0.9

1

Figure 11. Receiver-operator characteristic of a wireless doorbell

No device present
The device is set 10m away from the
antenna in the corridor
The device is set 8m away from the
antenna in the corridor
The device is set 5m away from the
antenna in the corridor
The device is set 3m away from the
antenna in the corridor..
The device is set 3m away from the
antenna in the chamber with door open
The device is set 3m away from the
antenna in the corridor with door closed.
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IV.

DEVICE DETECTION

As shown in the previous section, this short-term FFT
combined with a cross correlation technique can identify
different devices reasonably well. However, the error rate is a
little high when the device is far away. Artificial neural
networks have an ability to recognize complex patterns in the
data that may not be obvious to human observers. In this
section, we demonstrate how a neural network is used to
identify a particular device.
A. Parameters feeding the neural network
Data was collected from the three different signal sources,
the remote control toy truck and two door bells, and
preprocessed using the procedures described in Section III.
This data was used as the input for a neural network. For each
sample measurement, the data presented to the neural network
was the 8 cross-correlation values (i.e. one for each of the 8
frequency bands).

6
Measurement(inner product with chamber measurement)
Environment of measurement
5

B. Neural network setup and the training
There were 2045 measurements from all these devices.
Three neural networks were set up to identify the presence or
absence of each of the Three different devices. The data was
normalized before being presented to the neural network. A
multilayer perceptron (MLP) architecture 5S-1L was chosen
for the neural networks. The first hidden layer had 5 neurons
with a bipolar sigmoid transfer function. A linear transfer
function (L in the notation) was used in the output layer, which
has 1 neuron. The output neuron was used to identify if the
device was present or not.

Resembling
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In the training of each neural network, half of the 2045
measurements were used for the training, a quarter of the data
points were set aside as the validation set and a quarter were
reserved for the final test. The Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm
was used to train the neural networks.

Figure 10. Result of cross-correlating 2045 samples with the clean signal

For the other devices, a similar process can be applied. The
probability of detection is not as high as the remote control toy
truck because their signals are weaker. For example, Fig. 11
shows the probability detecting a wireless doorbell vs. the
probability of making a false detection. Using the previously
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C. Experimental results

V.

Upon completion of the training, the neural networks were
assessed using the reserved test set, based on two terms. One
term was the signal identification rate, which is the number of
correctly identified signals divided by the total number of the
signals in the test set. The other was the noise identification
rate, which is the number of the correctly identified noise (or
lack of a signal) measurements divided by the total number of
the noise measurements in the test set. Since the training of the
neural network started with random weight matrices, to
summarize the statistical properties of the device identification
results, each neural network was trained from 50 different
random weight matrices. The mean and the standard deviation
of signal and noise identification rates are presented in Table
III. The neural networks identified the different devices,
especially on the remote control toy truck, with a high degree
of accuracy. Interestingly, the noise identification rate was
extremely high, which is particularly important in real
applications.
TABLE III.

All active electronic devices radiate some electromagnetic
energy, either intentionally or unintentionally. These emissions
can be used to detect and locate these devices. Using a variety
of low-cost wireless receivers, we have demonstrated the
potential to detect and identify these receivers based on their
unintentional radiated emissions using neural networks. Good
results were achieved even in a very noisy environment.
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